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THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE:
DO ADOLESCENTS HAVE THE
RIGHT TO DIE?
Ann Eileen Driggs, R.N.t
INTRODUCTION
BENNY AND BILLY COULD HAVE BEEN best
friends. They were both teenagers who enjoyed spending time
with their friends and simply participating in the everyday ac-
tivities that most adolescents spend their free time doing. They
were both fiercely independent and striving to attain a position
of autonomy that could be considered far beyond their biologi-
cal years. More significantly, they both suffered from poten-
tially life-threatening illnesses and the painful effects, not only
of the disease process, but also of the medical care needed to
treat their illnesses. Eventually, neither teen wanted to continue
the medical treatments when they felt the pain and discomfort
had become too severe.
Benny Agrelo had been born with an enlarged, malfunc-
tioning liver and an enlarged spleen. In 1994, when he was fif-
teen years old, Benny had endured two liver transplants. The
first one was done when he was eight years old and for the fol-
lowing five years Benny took a drug called cyclosporin to pre-
vent his body from rejecting the new organ. When the medica-
tion no longer worked, doctors performed a second transplant
and prescribed an experimental anti-rejection drug that affected
his normal activities due to side effects of headaches and irrita-
bility. Without this drug, his system would reject the new liver
and Benny would ultimately die. Against his parents and doc-
tors' wishes, Benny decreased his dosage and eventually
stopped taking the medication altogether. Although Benny's
mother initially disagreed with him, she eventually supported
his decision. When his doctors discovered this, the hospital filed
t J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2002;
B.S., Lake Erie College, 1999, A.A.S., Kent State University, 1984.
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a petition under Florida's child neglect statute and social work-
ers removed Benny from his home and took him to the hospital.
Benny continued to refuse the medication and fought off the
staff when any treatments or tests were attempted. A court
hearing was held, and although under Florida law a minor had
no right to refuse life-saving medication, Benny was determined
to be mature enough to decide for himself and he was returned
to his home without the medication where he died a few months
later. The judge based this controversial decision on meetings
with Benny and his doctors. Benny's case established for the
first time, that a mature minor could refuse treatment on his
own behalf.'
Billy Best was a sixteen-year-old with Hodgkin's lym-
phoma. After just two and a half months of chemotherapy, Billy
began refusing his treatments even though doctors predicted an
80 percent chance of recovery. Although Billy's parents agreed
that the treatments were necessary, Billy complained that they
were painful and he did not think he could face the four more
months of treatment that were required. Late in 1994, after
writing a letter to his parents, Billy ran away from his home in
Massachusetts. He returned home a month later only after his
parents promised during a television interview that they would
not force him to continue the treatments. Interestingly, Billy's
lymphoma is now in remission due to alternative therapies.
2
Both the aforementioned cases have at least one significant
factor in common. One or both parents of the minor either
eventually agreed with the minor's decision to refuse treatment,
or eventually acquiesced to his decision. It's ironic that when a
minor refuses to take his medicine, kicks and screams about it,
complains of the side effects, or runs away from home, he can
be found to be mature; whereas if an adult acted in this same
manner, he would most certainly be considered immature.
From the day their children first enter the world, parents are
usually concerned with caring, nurturing and loving their chil-
dren. As a result, they strive to protect them from every con-
ceivable harm or chance of harm. Medical and psychological
studies have been conducted on the bonding of infants with
1 Nancy San Martin, Defiant Transplant Patient Dies at Home, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 21, 1994, at IA.2 See Christopher B. Daly, Teenage Cancer Patient Seeks to Return to Nor-
malcy-Chemotherapy Will Not Be Part of Treatment, WASH. PoST, Nov. 25, 1994, at
A3.
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their mother shortly after birth and the protective instincts that
result. It is difficult to let go of the protective instinct, even
when the child has matured and demonstrated the ability to
make informed and intelligent decisions on his own.
When a child falls ill, especially with a life-threatening ill-
ness, or is severely injured, the parents' protective instincts go
into "high gear." Even if the child is capable of taking part in
the making of a decision regarding his own care in this type of
situation, the typical reaction of parents is to treat him as if he
was incompetent and completely neglect the possible opinions
of the child. However, making the determination that a minor
has the adult capacity exclusively to decide to reject life-
sustaining medical treatment under the mature minor doctrine
may not be a suitable solution when a minor's wishes conflict
with his parents' decision. For my purposes here, life-sustaining
treatment means any treatment administered in a serious, acute
or terminal illness, or in a life-threatening situation that could
occur after a serious accident, such that the treatment necessary
would prevent or delay the death of the individual being treated.
The treatment can be defined as any medical procedure or
treatment administered to the individual at the direction of a
health care professional in an attempt to prevent or delay the
patient's death.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, parents have been afforded the right to make
medical care decisions for their minor children because children
have traditionally been recognized legally as incompetents
lacking the necessary capacity to make valid decisions.3 In her
article addressing the issue of children's health care decisions,
Jennifer Rosato, Associate Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law
School, states, "[t]hree primary justifications support this right:
parental decision-making benefits the parents, it benefits soci-
ety, and it benefits the children themselves." 4 The parents' fun-
3 See, e.g., In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 159 (1890) (stating the age at which
one becomes competent depends on the actions of the legislature); Bonner v. Moran,
126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (recognizing that some persons, because of their
youth, are incapable of making intelligent decisions, and public policy demands their
legal protection).
4 Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents
Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justifled?, 73
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (citations omitted) (explaining the current doctrine of par-
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damental rights to care for, control and make decisions for their
children can be limited only by a compelling state interest. The
U.S. Supreme Court addressed its reasons for ranting parents
broad decision-making power in Parham v. J.R. as follows:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, ex-
perience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it
has been recognized that natural bonds of affection lead
parents to act in the best interests of their children.
6
Although it can be argued that in some circumstances par-
ents do not, in effect, look out for their children's best interests,
they are probably in the best position to know and decide for
them when they are incapable of doing so themselves. However,
the rights of parents are not unrestricted but coexist with soci-
ety's right to protect children. This leads, of course, to the in-
tervention of the state to protect the child's best interests in in-
stances of child abuse or neglect. The broad language in most of
the child abuse or neglect statutes has been extended to apply to
state intervention when medical treatment has been denied to a
minor.7 The parent's denial of medical treatment for their minor
child can result in a judicial proceeding for child neglect or
abuse. The parent's unwillingness to protect the minor in these
situations then results in the state's protection of the child by
the ordering of administration of the treatment, a judicial safe-
guard that should effectively protect the child.
The courts have recognized three exceptions to the re-
quirement for parental consent in medical treatment of children:
(1) emergency; (2) emancipation; and (3) mature minor.' The
emergency situation permits medical personnel to treat a minor
ent-child decision-making in the health care context and arguing that change is neces-
sary).
5 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
6 Id. at 602.
7 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(challenging the constitutionality of Missouri's abortion statutes).
8 See Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337
(Kan. 1970) (holding that surgery performed on unconscious 17-year-old's finger
without parental consent fell within the mature minor exception).
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when the parents or guardian are not available to give consent. 9
This exception was not established to recognize the minor's
autonomy, however, but to protect the physician from liability
and has been recognized by some courts on the theory that in an
emergency situation, had the parent been available, he or she
would have consented. 10 The emancipation exception is based
on the principle that minors who are totally independent from
their parents should be treated as adults." The mature minor
exception permits a minor to consent to medical treatment if.he
is found competent enough to make the decision on his own.12
In the latter circumstance, the court must be petitioned to de-
termine whether the minor fully comprehends both the treat-
ment and the consequences.1 3
None of the aforementioned exceptions recognizes the mi-
nor's right to refuse medical treatment, life-sustaining or other-
wise. However, in some cases, such as Benny Agrelo's, it ap-
pears that some courts, although reluctantly, will allow a minor
to refuse life-sustaining treatment with parental consent. There
is a profound difference between receiving medical treatment
effecting a possible cure and return to a healthy condition and
the refusal of medical treatment resulting in probable death. No
minor, whether determined to be mature or not, should be given
the right to choose death over life.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Medical technology has made enormous strides in the past
few years. The ability to sustain life for increasingly longer pe-
riods of time has resulted in terminally ill, competent adults
9 See Sullivan v. Montgomery, 279 N.Y.S. 575, 576-77 (Sup. Ct. 1935)
(holding that parental consent was not required because the physician has a duty to
treat thepatient in an emergency when life is in danger).
1USee Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (holding emergency consent
is implied if medical treatment in an emergency involves a child or incompetent).
1 See Ison v. Florida Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 302 So. 2d 200, 201-02
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (defining a minor as being emancipated when she perma-
nently moved away from home and supported herself); see also Smith v. Seibly, 431
P.2d 719, 723 (Wash. 1967) (stating that emancipation of minor was justified when
he completed school, married, had a family, earned a living, and had his own home).
12 See generally Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (applying
the "mature minor" exception to finding 17-year-old individual had capacity to con-
sent).
13 See Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 829 (W. Va.
1992) (reversing trial court that refused to instruct jury on mature minor exception in
case where physician complied with a "do not resuscitate" order signed by minor).
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facing the sometimes complex question of whether to reject or
accept continued medical treatment. The Supreme Court in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health14 deter-
mined that the U.S. Constitution would grant a competent adult
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The court
based the decision on the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits
the state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of the law. The court interpreted the liberty
interest to include the right of a competent person to refuse
medical treatment. 5 Although Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent
vegetative state, the decision to remove medical treatment was
partially based on the clear and convincing evidence of her ex-
pressed desires prior to this condition. However, the court ex-
pressed no principles to be applied for protecting the interests of
incompetent persons who wished to refuse the same type of
treatment if there was no prior evidence of their desires.'
6
The courts first recognized the First Amendment right of
individuals whose refusal of medical treatment was based on
their religious beliefs in 1965.17 The Illinois Supreme Court
held that an adult Jehovah's Witness had a First Amendment
right to exercise religion freely in the context of refusal of
medical treatment (blood transfusion). 18 The state supreme court
ruled that the state could not interfere with an individual's con-
stitutional right to practice her religion freely.
The Constitution has left the protection of the individual's
personal right to privacy to the individual states.' 9 An adult's
constitutional right to privacy has been recognized by the Su-
preme Court in protecting the individual autonomy in matters of
14 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
15 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79.
16 See id. at 286-87.
17 See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Il. 1965). In this case, Bernice
Brooks refused blood transfusions because of her religious beliefs. The lower court
ordered the transfusions despite her objections. The Illinois Supreme Court heard the
case despite its mootness due to the substantial public interest involved. The Court
reversed the circuit court's decision stating that it interfered with Mrs. Brooks' basic
constitutional right to freely practice her religion.
'8 See id. at 442.
19 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "But the protection of a
person's general right to privacy ... is, like the protection of his property and of his
very life, left largely to the law of the individual States." Id. at 350-51.
[Vol. 11:687
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family, child-rearing and their education, and procreation. 20 The
right to privacy is not absolute, however, because the govern-
ment may intervene if a compelling state interest exists.21 Al-
though children also have constitutional rights, they are not
equal to those of adults 22 because children are vulnerable and
usually unable to make mature and reasonable decisions in seri-
ous or critical situations.23 A child's right to privacy is evalu-
ated by applying a less severe standard than that which is ap-
plied to adults. The state must show a significant state interest
rather than a compelling state interest in order to intervene in
the privacy right of a minor.24 The state has an interest in pro-
tecting children from harm and parents have an interest in rais-
ing and controlling their children. The rights of the parents in
this regard are significant to the state, anticipating the future
contributions of the minors. "The Supreme Court recognized
parental interests in their children under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, describing those interests as 'the
20 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (citing Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944); and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
21 See id. at 154, 163. The Roe court held that although the state has an inter-
est in protecting the health of its citizens, it could not interfere with an abortion deci-
sion unless it has a compelling interest. It set the "compelling point" in abortions at
the end of the first trimester because medical information at that time showed that the
mortality rate in first trimester abortions was less than that in normal childbirth.
2 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-37 (1968) (addressing a
minor's accessibility to obscene literature, and noting that, although adults could
judge and determine for themselves what to read and see, it was constitutionally per-
missible for the state to restrict the right of minors to access the same material).
23 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (declaring state statute uncon-
stitutional in its requirement of parental consent for a minor seeking abortion without
an accompanying provision providing an alternative procedure for authorization). As
stated by the Court:
The unique role in our society of the family, the institution by which "we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and
cultural," requires that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity
and flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. We have recog-
nized three reasons justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights
of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the peculiar vulnerabil-
ity of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing.
Id. at 634 (citation omitted). See also Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Aban-
doning Children to Their Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 449, 459 (1996).
24 See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 427-28 (1983) (holding a state cannot interfere with a woman's right to obtain
an abortion absent a compelling interest).
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liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.'
25
The constitutional right of a competent adult to refuse
treatment in a life-threatening situation was first recognized by
the Supreme Court in the Cruzan case in 1990.26 Because of a
child's inability to make mature and informed decisions in this
type of situation, and because of the role of the parents in the
lives of their children, the courts have generally not extended
this right to minors.27 It is only in specific situations, such as
abortion, dispensing of contraceptives, and mental health, that
minors are sometimes permitted to make decisions without pa-
rental consent. The rationale for these exceptions was the possi-
ble impact on public health if the medical conditions remained
untreated and parental consent were to be required.28 None of
these exceptions to parental consent involve the possibility that
death of the minor will result.
The Supreme Court has found statutes in both Massachu-
setts and Missouri unconstitutional because they required pa-
rental consent for a minor to have an abortion. As a result,
women under the age of majority are able to exercise their con-
stitutional privacy rights and undergo an abortion without the
prerequisite of parental consent.29 In striking down the Missouri
statute, the Supreme Court noted that there is no magic line that
defines the attainment of majority for any individual, and mi-
nors as well as adults should be protected by the Constitution.
3 0
The Supreme Court held that "the State may not impose a blan-
ket provision... requiring the consent of a parent... as a condition
for abortion.. .the State does not have the constitutional author-
ity to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto
over the decision of the physician and his patient.... 31 In addi-
25 Frances J. Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppucci, Special Collection, Psychology
and the Law: Effects of Psychopathology on Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 5
U. CM. SCH. ROuNDTABLE 63, 69 (1998) (discussing the rights of adolescents and
parents in medical decision-making).26 Cmzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,278 (1990).
27 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634.
28 See Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 25, at 70.
29 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (finding Massachusetts statute
unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,71
(1976) (finding Missouri statute unconstitutional).
30 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri, 428 U.S. at 74 (discussing a
minor's constitutional rights and protections).
31 Id.
694 [Vol. 11:687
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tion, as the Supreme Court noted in Bellotti v. Baird,32 "there
can be no doubt that a female's constitutional right to an abor-
tion in the first trimester does not depend on her calendar age."
The Court struck down the Massachusetts statute requiring pa-
rental consent for a minor's abortion noting that the statute was
not enacted to protect the minor, but to recognize the rights of
the parents.33
Confidentiality is a crucial factor in the dispensing of birth
control to minors. If this confidentiality were not respected,
teenagers would be deterred from seeking contraception with
the possible result of an escalating teenage pregnancy rate.
34
There is also the health risk of an increase in sexually transmit-
ted diseases, which was actually the motivating factor in the
states' enactment of these laws, and not the maturity of the mi-
nor.35 Furthermore, the facts demonstrate that most minors
would cease to use contraception, but not cease sexual activity,
if it were necessary to involve their parents in the decision.36
Confidentiality is also an issue in the treatment of mental
health problems. Some states have recognized the fact that
many minors might not seek help with problems such as alco-
holism, drug abuse,37 depression, and other psychiatric care38 if
parental consent were required. These exceptions to the general
rule are considered by some to be an outgrowth of the emer-
gency treatment exception for minors and the states' role in the
32 Belloti, 443 U.S. at 628 (quoting Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 855-
56 (D. Mass. 1975)).
31 See id. at 644-50.
34 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001,
1005-06 (D. Utah 1983) (holding state law unconstitutional in its requirement of
parental consent for minor's appropriation of contraception).
35 See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tenn. 1984) (holding that
mature minor had capacity to consent to a medical procedure based on the common
law of the state).36 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah, 582 F. Supp. at 1009.
37 For statutes allowing minors to obtain treatment for alcohol and substance
abuse, see ALA. CODE § 22-8-6 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2892(a) (1992);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-1-402 (1991); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.050 (Michie
1998). 38 For statutes permitting minors to receive mental health services and psychi-
atric care without parental consent, see ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1997); COLO. REv.
STAT. § 27-10-103 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.56(1) (West 1998) (permitting a
child twelve years of age and older to volunteer for treatment without parental con-
sent); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-20 (1995) (regulating the admission of patients, in-
cluding minors, for hospitalization).
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protection of minors.39 This can be further evidenced by studies
indicating that factors such as family stressors and parental psy-
chopathology may play a part in the mental health care deci-
sion.40 These exceptions are not based on the level of maturity
of the minor, but rather are based on the issues of the possible
transmission of venereal disease, an increase in teenage preg-
nancy, and confidentiality.
STATES' APPLICATION OF MATURE
MINOR DOCTRINE
State courts have not been consistent in their decisions
when a minor rejects life-sustaining treatment, and in most
states unemancipated minors are not afforded the right to make
their own medical decisions. However, three states have
adopted the mature minor exception to consent or refuse spe-
cific medical treatment.41 Also, minors who are fourteen years
of age or older in Alabama are permitted to give consent for
medical treatment.42 However, there are no cases in that state
addressing the right of a minor to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment. When the circumstances involve a life-threatening situa-
tion, courts have generally not extended the right to reject life-
sustaining treatment to minors and are reluctant to apply the
mature minor doctrine. The mature minor doctrine permits a
39 See generally Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-
Evaluating Modem Statutory Rape Law, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 48
(1994) (reconsidering confidentiality issues, as they affect minors, in modem statu-
tory rape laws).40 See Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 25, at 72.
41 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (II. 1989). The court stated that, if the trial
judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is mature enough, the
mature minor doctrine affords the minor the common law right to consent to or refuse
medical treatment. However, if the parent or guardian opposes the mature minor's
refusal of treatment for life-threatening health problems, it would weigh heavily on
the minor's right to refuse. See id. A "Do Not Resuscitate" order is not valid in West
Virginia without the consent of the minor, if the minor is between the ages of sixteen
and eighteen, and if the minor has been found to have sufficient maturity in the
opinion of the attending physician. If there is a conflict between the wishes of the
parent and the wishes of the minor, the decision of the mature minor prevails. See
Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1992); see also W.
VA. CODE § 16-30C-6 (1998). The mature minor exception to the general rule re-
quiring parental consent for medical treatment of minors is part of the common law in
Tennessee, however, its application is a question of fact for a jury to decide whether
the minor has the capacity to consent. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739
(Tenn. 1987).42 See ALA. CODE § 22-8-4 (1997).
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minor who exhibits the maturity of an adult to make decisions
traditionally reserved for those who have attained the age of
majority. 43 Adolescent minors are somewhere between child-
hood and adulthood. The years between approximately fourteen
and eighteen have become a veritable never-never land when
attempting to evaluate their capacity and competence in the
world of informed consent. Legally, children in this age group
are considered minors and, traditionally, they are considered
legal incompetents.
44
In a New York State case, the court equated the age at
which an individual could consent to medical treatment with the
age at which he could make a legal binding contract because,
until that age, persons were incompetent. 45 However, some mi-
nors in this age category have been deemed "mature minors" by
some courts and have been afforded the right to make decisions
regarding their own health care in specific situations. When the
specific situation concerns a choice between life and death, al-
lowing "mature minors" to decide on death is not appropriate.
Illinois recognizes the mature minor doctrine, including
those circumstances that involve life-threatening illnesses.46 In
the Illinois case, In re E.G., addressing a minor's refusal of
blood transfusions based on religious beliefs, 47 the court fo-
cused on the state's interests and found they outweighed those
of the minor and ordered the transfusions. 48 On appeal, the ap-
pellate court held that the minor could exercise her First
Amendment right to practice her religion and that she was a
partially emancipated minor.49 In finding that she was partially
43 See Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The Potential Right of Chronically Ill
Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment-Fatal Misuse of the Mature
Minor Doctrine, 45 DEPAuL L. REv. 1165, 1166 (1996) (discussing the mature minor
doctrine as applied to chronically ill minors).
44 See In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157, 159 (1890) (stating that the age at which
minors become competent is within the discretion and determination of the legisla-
ture).
45 See In re Alphonso, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 1993).
46 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327-28 (holding that "[i]f the evidence is
clear and convincing that the minor is mature enough to appreciate the consequences
of her actions, and ... to exercise the judgment of an adult, then the mature minor
doctrine affords her the common law right to consent to or refuse medical treat-
ment").
47 See id. (basing decision to refuse transfusion on membership in Jehovah's
witness faith).
49 See id. at 324 (citing to the trial court's decision).
49 See id. (citing to the appellate court's decision).
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emancipated, the court relied on the fact that E.G. was only six
months shy of her eighteenth birthday and, in the opinion of the
psychiatrist who had evaluated her, she had the maturity level
of an eighteen to twenty-one-year-old and the competency to
reject the transfusions even if death would result.50
Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court refused to address
the First Amendment right,51 and instead made its decision by
applying three state statutes: (1) The Consent by Minors to
Medical Operations Act,52 which permits minors to consent to
medical treatment in specific situations; (2) The Emancipation
of Mature Minors Act,53 which states that a minor who is six-
teen years of age or older may be declared emancipated and
control his own health decisions; and (3) The Juvenile Court
Act of 1987, 54 which permits juveniles under the age of eighteen
to be prosecuted as an adult in criminal court in some instances.
The court stated that, under common law, a minor who has not
as yet attained the age of eighteen may not be precluded from
exercising rights normally associated with adulthood if found to
be a mature minor,55 and affirmed the appellate court's decision
that the seventeen-year-old was a mature minor and could exer-
cise her common law right to refuse medical treatment (blood
transfusions).56 Although E.G. had attained the age of eighteen
by the time her case reached the Illinois Supreme Court, the
court felt that there was sufficient public interest in the case that
an authoritative determination should be made to establish some
type of guidance for future cases. 57
The court in In re E.G. was careful to note that the common
law right to consent to or refuse medical treatment was not ab-
solute, but rather must be balanced against the state interests of
preservation of life, protection of the interests of third parties,
prevention of suicide and maintenance of the ethical integrity of
50 See id. (relying on E.G.'s age and prior testimony from a psychiatric expert
who evaluated E.G.'s maturity and competency).
5' See id. at 325-26, 328 (concluding that a mature minor may consent to or
refuse medical care).
52 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/1 (West 1997).
53 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 30/1-30/11 (West 1999).
54 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-1-4057-1 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000).
55 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 325 (stating that "age is not an impenetrable
barrier").
56 See id. at 328.
57 See id. at 325 (opining that the issue in the case was one of "substantial
public interest," and therefore, permitted a departure from mootness doctrine).
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the medical profession.58 There must be clear and convincing
evidence that the minor fully understands the consequences of
his actions, and, in making judgments, he must exhibit the ma-
turity of an adult.59 In addition, it is significant in this case that
the minor's mother supported her decision to reject the transfu-
sions. The court was careful to note that, had her mother agreed
to the transfusions, serious consideration would have been given
to the mother's wishes.
60
In 1990, the Maine court based a decision on prior state-
ments made by a mature minor when it permitted his parents to
refuse life saving treatment when the minor was unable to ver-
balize his own wishes.61 Seventeen-year-old Chad had been in
an automobile accident that left him in a persistent vegetative
state.62 Based on prior discussions with Chad regarding his wish
that he not be kept alive by artificial means, his parents peti-
tioned the court for a judgment that they would not be held li-
able if they participated in removing Chad's feeding tubes.63
Ultimately, the Maine Supreme Court ruled that Chad's previ-
ously voiced preference that he did not wish to be kept alive by
artificial means was clear and convincing evidence, and his
statements were controlling.64 Although Chad made the deci-
sions before he reached the age of maturity, the court based its
decision on: (1) the rule that competent minors could testify as
witnesses; (2) the common law presumption of competency for
persons at least fourteen years old; (3) persons attain capacity at
different ages; and (4) the Illinois Supreme Court decision in In
re E.G.65 Although Chad's preference was addressed by the
court, the parent's wish to remove the feeding tubes was also
given weight in the decision.
58 See id. at 328 (citing In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989)).
59 See id. at 327-28 (outlining the balancing test a judge must perform in de-
terminiiN a minor's ability to make a decision to consent to or refuse medical care).
See id. at 328.
61 See In re Swan, 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990) (holding that parents were enti-
tled to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from unemancipated mature minor son,
after he had expressly stated that he would not want to live in a persistent vegetative
state).
62 See id. at 1203.
63 See id. at 1204, 1206.
64 See id. at 1206 (relying on precedent established in In re Gardner, 54 A.2d
947 (Me. 1987), and mature minor's own professed wishes).
65 See id. at 1205-06.
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Although New York courts seem to value the mature minor
concept, they have been reluctant to base any decisions on it. In
a 1990 case involving the rejection of blood transfusions by a
minor based on religious beliefs, the court simply stated that the
minor was not mature66 and refused to allow a seventeen-year-
old to reject medical treatment, although it did acknowledge the
existence of the mature minor doctrine. The judge believed that
the minor in this case lacked both a clear understanding of his
religious beliefs and the consequences of his actions. 6In de-
nying the minor's petition, the court cited the Illinois decision
in In re E.G. and stated that the evidence of the minor's matur-
ity in this case was not "clear and convincing." 68
The Georgia courts have not recognized the right of minors
to refuse life-saving medical treatment under a mature minor
doctrine. In Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hospital,69 the
plaintiffs argued that the Georgia Code70 supported the right of
the mature minor to refuse blood transfusions because there
were exceptions stated in the code for some classifications of
minors to so consent or refuse. The Code addresses the adult's
power to consent and the right to refuse; however, there are ex-
ceptions for married minors, pregnant minors and minors with
children.7' The minor's maturity is not an issue in these in-
stances, but rather they are considered "adults" based on their
relative position in society. The court found that the rights were
those of an adult, not a minor, mature or otherwise. It further
stated that, if a mature minor were to be recognized as an ex-
ception, specific provision would have been made a part of the
statute.72 In its decision, the court cited the fact that the age of
majority in Georgia 73 is eighteen and that the rights are limited
only to those individuals who have attained that age and are
then considered adults, or are in a class specifically addressed
by the statute. It also noted the lack of the plaintiff to show any
66 See In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (Sup. Ct.
1990).
67 See id.
6 1 Id. (citing In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1989)).
69 849 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
70 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 39-9-2, 31-9-7 (1996) (discussing persons authorized to
consent to medical treatment and to refuse medical treatment, respectively).
71 See GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2(a)(2), (3), & (5) (1996).72 See Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1574-77.
73 See GA. CODE ANN. § 39-9-7(1996).
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reported Georgia cases recognizing an exception other than
those provided in the statutes.
74
Also, courts are notoriously inconsistent in the use of a
standard of proof that is required for application of the mature
minor doctrine. Some courts have relied on the clear and con-
vincing evidence test to prove a minor's maturity.75 Courts have
also applied the standard of "Rule of Sevens" which is derived
from English common law. 76 This standard is based on the
child's reasoning ability, and supports the assumption that a mi-
nor older than fourteen has the capacity to give consent for
medical treatment. 77 The rule divides minors into three groups:
(1) children under the age of seven have no capacity to formu-
late criminal intent and cannot be guilty of a crime; (2) children
between the ages of seven and fourteen are presumed not to
have capacity to form criminal intent; and (3) children older
than fourteen are presumed to have that capacity. However,
these are presumptions that can be disproved by other evi-
dence.78
Although several courts agree with the presumptions used
in the Rule of Sevens, they are not consistent in the methods
they use to make the determination. The Illinois courts have fo-
cused on the minor's ability to understand his or her own ac-
tions.79 New York has tried to identify whether the minor has
reached the age of discretion. 80 The Pennsylvania court has
made the determination based on whether the minor answered
questions with no hesitation and appeared to understand the
benefits and/or complications of an operation if he agreed or
rejected it.8 1 In Tennessee, the focus of the court was whether
74 See Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1576.
75 See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327-28 (111. 1989) (discussing an
unemancipated minor's right to refuse a blood transfusion).
76 See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987) (explaining
application of the "Rule of Sevens" to determine capacity).
77 See id.
18 See Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 33 (Ohio 1956) (stating that a minor
who underwent plastic surgery without parental consent had the degree of maturity to
understand the procedure and risks).79 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 327-28.
80 See Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (Sup. Ct.
1966) (reiterating that, upon reaching the age of 18 years, one has reached the age of
majority).
so See In re Green, 307 A.2d 279, 280 (Pa. 1973) (holding that when both the
mother and son refused surgery, the state did not have sufficient interest to outweigh
their religious beliefs).
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the minor had the maturity, experience, education, and judg-
ment to make a decision regarding medical treatment.
82
It appears from the cases studied that, even when the courts
acknowledge the mature minor doctrine, the decisions are actu-
ally based not specifically on the fact that the minor has been
determined mature, but on additional criteria as cited in the
opinions. The courts will at times allow the rejection of life-
sustaining treatment by a minor if at least one parent agrees
with the minor's decision, or the minor is within a few months
of eighteen years of age, or the minor had expressed his wishes
and these wishes were supported by his parents.83 It appears that
in most cases, courts defer to the minor's refusal of treatment
only if one or both parents agree with that decision. The courts
are reluctant to override the parent's decision to treat regardless
of the minor's refusal. Some courts struggle with the decision if
this is not the case and end up refusing the minor's rejection of
the treatment anyway.84 It would seem that the parent's mature
and thoughtful decision, whatever it might be, made after con-
sultation with physicians and possibly a member of a bioethics
committee of the hospital, should be honored without the agony
and time consuming process of a court procedure. The parents
know the child best and are usually in the optimal position to
make a valid informed decision regarding the child's care and
treatment.
CHILD COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT THEORIES
How is it determined that a minor is a "mature minor"?
What is a "mature minor"? To determine if a child is "mature",
the development of the child must be studied and researched.
Child development research has resulted in several differing
theories. Which one is to be used when determining the matur-
ity of a child or, more specifically, which one should be deemed
most accurate?
82 See Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 748-49.
83 See In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (III. 1989); see also In re Swan, 569 A.2d
1202 (Me. 1990).
84 See In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1990)
(holding that patient who refused to consent to blood transfusion on religious grounds
was not a "mature minor" and that the court had authority to act as parens patriae to
order treatment to save the patient's life).
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The most noted researcher in the area of child cognitive
development is Jean Piaget. 85 His theory proposes that there are
four stages of development based on knowledge that develops
and increases until it has reached that point where it is fully ef-
fectual. He theorized that the stages were influenced by self-
learning and education.86 He proposes that the last stage of de-
velopment occurs between the ages of eleven and fifteen during
which the child engages in independent thought, can draw de-
ductions and understand theories. His theory proposes that by
fifteen the child is in a mature state that includes a mature
thinking process. 87 One criticism of Piaget's theory is his ne-
glect of the effect of other people and the environment on the
behavior of the child.88 In addition, subsequent research has in-
dicated that the Piagetian stages do not include all the abilities
of children nor their mastery of all tasks simultaneously within
each stage. 9 Differences in each child's abilities at any given
age may occur due to personality, specific demands made upon
the child, or their individual conceptual knowledge at the time.
90
Studies also indicate that children apply a reasoning concept
more consistently when it is newly learned rather than when
they understand it better, and that the child's functioning within
a stage could possibly represent the child's most advanced rea-
soning, but not his average, normal reasoning ability.91 Thus,
performance at a specific stage does not guarantee that the child
can think equally well about all problems encountered, or think
at that same level at all times.92
More recently, some researchers in the field of adolescent
behavior have concluded that the decision-making process of
85 Jean Piaget was a Swiss psychologist who, with his associates, published
findings on the development of cognitive processes in children. Published since 1927,
it is the largest accumulation of factual and theoretical observations to date. See JOHN
L. PnLLIPS, JR., PIAGET'S THEORY: A PRIMER 4-9 (1981).
86 See R. MURRAY THOMAS, COMPARING THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT
284-85 (3d ed. 1992) (describing how a child's intellectual development arises from
the child's direct participation in events).
87 See id. at 298-99.
88 See id. at 316 (noting criticism by B.J. Zimmerman that Piaget placed little
emphasis on the effect of social dimensions on a child's environment).89 See Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 25, at 76.
90 See Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing a Child's
Capacity to Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873, 1878-86 (1996) (discussing
Piagetian and other child development theories).
91 See Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 25, at 77.
92 See id.
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fourteen-year-olds is comparable to that of adults. 93 These re-
searchers theorize that, the older the adolescent, the more con-
sideration is given to risk and future consequences. They be-
lieve that the ability to compare information improves between
the ages of ten and thirteen. However, although researchers
agree that society and the environment influence the develop-
ment of the adolescent, they differ as to how much, when it oc-
curs, and to what extent. 94 Professor Elizabeth Scott states that
many studies fail to include: (1) peer influence; (2) tendency to
focus on immediate rather than long-term consequences; and (3)
an inclination to make risky choices, when evaluating adoles-
cent decision-making capabilities. 95 Research also seems to in-
dicate that adolescents and adults differ in their perspective of
the world.96 Adolescents generally place greater importance on
short-term consequences while adults focus on long term conse-
quences.97 Other research has shown that, when older adoles-
cents consider issues concerning family, education, and careers,
93 See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1320 (citing a study published by Lois Weithorn
and Susan Campbell).
94 See, e.g., William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive
Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 898 (1989)
(theorizing that there are no stages of development, but that skills to perform different
tasks develop at different times); see also URiE BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 9-10, 16-42 (1979) (theorizing that social and physical set-
tings also affect a child's development); Yoshiald Nakajima & Miho Hotta, A Devel-
opmental Study of Cognitive Processes in Decision Making: Information Searching
as a Function of Task Complexity, PSYCHOL. REP., Feb. 1989, at 67 (finding that
children age fifteen and older used more systematic strategies when making decisions
than children under age twelve); Catherine C. Lewis, How Adolescents Approach
Decisions: Changes Over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications, 52 CHILD
DEv. 538 (1981) (finding that older adolescents considered future risks and conse-
quences more than younger adolescents); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg,
The Cognitive & Affective Influences on Adolescent Decision-Making, 68 TEMPLE L.
REv. 1763 (1995); Jennifer Soper, Student Article, Straddling the Line: Adolescent
Pregnancy & Questions of Capacity, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 195, 199 n.31 (1999)
(citing GERALD P. KOOCHER & PATRICIA C. KEITH-SPIEGEL, CHILDREN, ETHICS & THE
LAW 7 (1990); 1 DONALD KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 14.01 (2d ed.
1994)).
95 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in Adolescent Decision-
making, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1607, 1643-46 (1992) (comparing adolescent decision-
making to adult decision-making and arguing that adolescents deserve more auton-
omy than they currently possess).
9 See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in
Legal Contexts, 19 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 231 (1995) (comparing adolescent and
adult attitudes and perceptions of risk).
97 See id.
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they tend to look more towards the future than younger adoles-
cents. 98 As Cauffman and Steinberg have concluded: "While
studies have generally found few cognitive differences between
adolescents and adults, this should not be taken as evidence that
adolescents are as capable as adults of making consistently ma-
ture decisions." 9
9
The ability to make rational decisions and competent judg-
ments is a learned activity that develops over a period of
time.1°° The person makes decisions and judgments in different
circumstances and eventually acquires the ability to adapt those
judgments and decisions to differing circumstances in his life. 101
In effect, the ability to make appropriate decisions takes a con-
siderable amount of repetition and practice. Errors in judgment
and poor decisions can be made during this learning process.
However, although the adolescent may make these errors in
judgment, hopefully he learns from them, and eventually im-
proves his performance. Furthermore, the ability to make ap-
propriate and valid decisions may depend on the experiences the
adolescent has had and the cognitive maturity he possesses at
the time those experiences occur.102 Because each child matures
at a different rate, it is difficult to know at exactly what stage
each one has arrived at any given time.
Exposure to stress can also result in ineffective or flawed
decision-making. Cauffman and Steinberg discuss "three pri-
mary ways in which stress can cause decision-making errors.
The first, premature closure, occurs when a decision is reached
before all available alternatives have been considered. The sec-
ond, nonsystematic scanning, refers to the consideration of al-
ternatives in a disorganized, almost 'panic-like' fashion. Fi-
nally, temporal narrowing may produce faulty decisions because
the person acts impulsively and does not give ample time to
98 See Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of
the Development of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 1,
28 (1991).
99 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 94, at 1788.
10o See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD OF ADO-
LESCENCE 90-91 (1982) (discussing the fact that young people acquire maturity and
judgment over a period of time).
1o1 See Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech: The Work of the Schools as
Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1293 (1991) (evaluating the learn-
ing processes of law students).
102 See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A De-
cision-Making Perspective, 12 DEELOPMENTAL REv. 1, 29 (1992).
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consider alternatives." 10 3 There is no doubt that an adolescent
suffering from a serious illness is under severe stress that could
compromise rational and effective reasoning and thinking. The
resulting decisions made by him could then be, not only irra-
tional, but not in his best interest.
Lynn Ponton, an adolescent psychiatrist at the University of
California, has studied adolescent behavior, especially in the
area of risk-taking. She has found that adolescents are fre-
quently involved in varying degrees of unhealthy risk-taking. 10 4
Although most risk-taking during these years is a normal, de-
velopmental behavior (positive risk-taking) teaching adoles-
cents how to think, act, and understand consequences of their
behavior, it can be potentially dangerous when it has predomi-
nantly negative results.10 5 During this time, teens want their
maturity and independence recognized. However, although they
can make independent choices, parents need to set limits and let
them know they are not permitted to do everything they want to
do in every situation. 1°6 Risk-taking is the beginning of a life-
long process that involves learning to make decisions based on
good judgment, but adolescents are not as yet able to fully as-
sess the risks that may be inherent in any given decision. They
tend to look at one side of a problem, not the complete picture.
As yet, they do not have the wealth of life experiences of an
adult to adequately assess the consequences of their actions.10 7
Furthermore, many factors such as illness, culture, onset of pu-
berty, peer involvement, and other social factors affect the abil-
ity of the adolescent to adequately assess risk. 108
The study of adolescents suffering from chronic illness and
the attendant psychosocial effects is a relatively new area of
research. 10 9 Although there is numerous research on normal
child development, the particular area of study that investigates
how adolescents view the impact of their illness on their family,
social and personal well-being, has just recently been ad-
103 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 94, at 1782.
104 LYNN E. PONTON, THE ROMANCE OF RISK: WHY TEENAGERS Do THE
THINGS THEY DO 1 (1997).
10" See id. at 6-7.
'
0 6 See id. at 13.
107 See id. at 34.
108 See id. at 276-77.
109 See Penkower, supra note 43, at 1192-99 (discussing the effects of illness
on adolescents).
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dressed." 0 Research has shown that chronic or serious illness
may leave the minor with a feeling of uncertainty about the fu-
ture and doubt that he will ever be happy."' These adolescents
are also more likely to develop major psychosocial problems
than those who are healthy." 2 Researchers have also found that
serious or chronic illness has a potential impact on develop-
mental tasks during adolescence. 3 Risk-taking behavior may
increase, self-esteem may be lowered, emotional difficulties
may increase, and the sense of personal identity may be com-
promised." 4 It would seem that these factors would then ad-
versely affect the adolescent's decision-making capabilities. It
would be difficult, at best, for the adolescent to make a decision
that is not distorted by these factors at a time when his health is
so compromised.
Development does not seem as simple an evaluation as
Piaget once believed. Adolescence is a period of time when mi-
nors begin to make new decisions based on their newly devel-
oped capabilities, but there is usually the presence of adults to
protect them from catastrophe and from suffering the conse-
quences of their possible mistakes in judgment. During this time
of "not quite completely autonomous", it would appear, as some
argue, that societal influences and life experience should be in-
cluded with any assessment of adolescent competence." 5 Fur-
thermore, an adolescent who is compromised by illness may not
be in a condition to make valid decisions regarding his life. The
only consistency in any of the theories appears to be that, as a
child grows older, he does in fact exhibit an increase in knowl-
edge and the ability to assimilate that knowledge into his life
110 See, e.g., Tracy R. Shaben, Psychosocial Issues in Kidney-Transplanted
Children and Adolescents: Literature Review, 20 AM. NEPHROLOGY NuRsES' ASS'N
J. 663 (1993) (reviewing information addressing the psychosocial issues of children
and adolescents who have had kidney transplants or who suffer from serious or
chronic illness).
11 See Penkower, supra note 43, at 1192 n.183 (citing Christine Harrison,
Caring for the Chronically Ill Child, 3 CALYX: ETHICAL ISSUES IN PAEDIATRICS 1, 1
(1993)).
12 See Mario Capelli et al., Chronic Disease and Its Impact: The Adolescent's
Perspective, 10 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 283, 283 (1989).
113 See S. Sexson & J. Rubenow, Transplants in Children and Adolescents, in
PSYCHIATRIC ASPECTS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 33, 35 (John Craven & Gary M.
Rodin eds., 1992) (summarizing the potential impact that chronic illness has on de-
velopmental tasks during adolescence in Table 4.1).
114 See id.
15 See Lexcen & Reppucci, supra note 25, at 77.
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decisions and judgments. At what exact age that occurs depends
on a myriad of external factors in the child's life.
ADOLESCENT PHYSICAL DEVELOPMENT
Not only is cognitive development instrumental in an ado-
lescent's ability to make proper decisions, it has been discov-
ered that the brain in an adolescent is still in the growing and
maturing stages, an "adolescent phase" of brain growth." 6 Until
recently, studies in brain growth involved research in ani-
mals." 7 Using the technology of magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) n 8 and positron emission tomography (PET)," 9 research-
ers have been able to view the brain in a way that was impossi-
ble not so many years ago. By using the MRI scanner, the cor-
tex growth of the brain can be monitored by measuring the
thickness of the gray matter forming the outer part of the brain
to within a millimeter of accuracy. PET uses radioactive mark-
ers to highlight those areas of the brain that are working the
hardest. These medical diagnostic techniques have shown that
brain growth continues well into adolescence. 120 In the last few
years, neuroscientists discovered that at about the age of eleven
the brain begins to undergo reorganization in the area associated
with activities such as social behavior and impulse control. Be-
cause of this developmental activity or plasticity,121 the brain is
believed to be very vulnerable, especially to traumatic experi-
ences, and unable to handle social pressures and stress in the
same manner as the fully developed adult brain. 122 As a result,
116 See generally Paul M. Thompson et al., Growth Patterns in the Developing
Brain Detected by Using Continuum Mechanical Tensor Maps, NATURE, Mar. 9,
2000, at 190; Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859 (1999).
117 See generally NEUROBEHAVIORAL PLASTICITY: LEARNING, DEVELOPMENT,
AND RESPONSE TO BRAIN INSULTS (Norman E. Spear et al. eds., 1995) (reporting tech-
nical innovations and research in behavioral neuroscience); Bryan Kolb & Ian Q.
Whishaw, Brain Plasticity and Behavior, 49 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 43 (1998) (dis-
cussing animal research in brain growth and behavior).
118 See Sowell et al., supra note 116, at 859.119 See Kathiann M. Kowalski, What's Inside the Teenage Brain: How Neuro-
chemistry Affects Thought Processes, CURRENT HEALTH 2, Nov. 1, 2000, at 12; see
also Thompson et al., supra note 116, at 192.120 See Sowell et al., supra note 116, at 859-60.
121 See HUGH BROWN, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR: A TEXTBOOK OF PHYSIOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGY 378 (1976) (defining plasticity as "capable of being molded, reshaped,
[or] reformed").
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adolescents are more apt to exhibit reckless and impulsive be-
havior.
Two recent studies have contributed to this theory. One
study tracked changes over a number of years in the brains of
children.1 23 The other compared brain maturation in twelve to
sixteen year olds with adults in their twenties.1 24 Areas of the
brain that control functions such as planning, organization, in-
hibition, and emotions were found to continue to develop be-
tween adolescence and adulthood.125
A complex system of neurons in the brain interconnect and
are responsible for communicating information to the various
areas of the brain.1 26 It was previously believed that most brain
growth and increase in the number of these neurons was com-
plete by the age of six. 127 Scientists believed until recently that,
after this age, the number of neurons decreased and there were
no new connections formed. 28 However, recent studies indicate
that a significant number of new connections continue to form
well into adolescence.1 29 Included in this growth are new con-
nections in the two halves of the brain's cerebrum, areas that are
involved with judgment-making and the controlling of emo-
tions.1 30 Because of this continued development and growth
during adolescence, teens may rely more on the emotional cen-
ters of the brain rather than the areas that will eventually be re-
lied upon as an adult when making judgments.' 3' As a result,
decisions made during the teen years may be made strictly on an
emotional basis rather than a more appropriate judgment ba-
sis.132
Until this discovery was made, it had been believed that the
unpredictable behavior of children in this age group was solely
attributable to the hormonal changes occurring in their bodies.
122 See Kowalski, supra note 119, at 6; see also Linda Patia Spear, Neurobe-
havioral Changes in Adolescence, CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI., Aug. 2000,
at 112.
12 3 See Thompson et al., supra note 116, at 190-91.
124 See Sowell et al., supra note 116, at 859.
'25 See id. at 860-61.
126 See Kowalski, supra note 119, at 6.
127 See id.
'28 See id.
129 See Thompson et al., supra note 116, at 190-91.
130 See Kowalski, supra note 119, at 6.
131 See id.
132 See id.
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These hormonal changes during adolescence can cause a swel-
ling of a part of the limbic system, called the amygdala, that is
thought to be involved with emotional reactivity and in coordi-
nating response to stress.1 33 The limbic system consists of parts
of the cerebrum, the thalamus, and the hypothalamus and con-
tributes to learning, memory, and emotions. The cerebrum is the
brain's thinking and feeling center. Because the limbic system
generates feelings and emotions of fear and anger, these emo-
tions may be intensified during this time due to the swelling. 134
Although the hormonal changes have some bearing on the
sometimes erratic and unpredictable behavior of adolescents,
this new theory proposes that changes in behavior may also be
partially attributable to the new brain growth. This recent dis-
covery adds a whole new dimension to adolescent behavior and
the inappropriate choices and decisions that can be made during
that time.
To further complicate matters, the use of tobacco, alcohol,
and illegal drugs can destroy brain cells and interfere with nor-
mal brain development by impairing memory and learning abil-
ity. 135 A study done by the National Institute of Drug Abuse has
shown that by their senior year in high school, a significant
number of teens have used alcohol and other drugs. 136 Since
many teens are exposed to one or all of these, this further con-
tributes to possible erratic behavior and inappropriate decision-
making exhibited by some adolescents.
As yet there is no way to know exactly what the discovery
of this teen phase of brain development means, although the
patterns of changes observed in the brain between adolescence
and adulthood are consistent with cognitive development during
this time. 37 Because there has been a tendency to believe that
adolescents' brains are already at the adult stage of develop3
ment, there has not been much research done in this area.
Teenage behavior has, for the most part, been attributed to
133 See generally Spear, supra note 122, at 113.
'34 See Kowalski, supra note 119, at 7, 11.
131 See id. at 8, 12.
136 See Spear, supra note 122, at 112 (citing to a 1996 study showing that, by
their senior year, approximately 50% of adolescents have used marijuana or hashish,
65% have smoked cigarettes, and 82% have drunk alcohol).
137 See Sowell et al., supra note 116, at 860.
138 See John McCrone, Rebels With a Cause, NEw ScwNnsT, Jan. 22, 2000, at
25-26
[Vol. 11:687
MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
"surging hormones" and a lack of life experience. 139 Although
they probably play a role, it now appears that this new teenage
phase of brain development also has an effect on the how and
why adolescents act. Skeptics have taken a cautious view of this
new theory, especially because of the lack of research in this
area. Although the patterns of changes in the brain between
adolescence and adulthood are consistent with cognitive devel-
opment, 14 it is still necessary to make a definitive causal con-
nection between the evidence of this physical change to ob-
served mental changes. 14 Researchers believe that future stud-
ies of microscopic brain tissue should also be done to help rein-
force these new findings.142
Whether this new brain growth actually does have a sig-
nificant effect on adolescent behavior remains to be seen. As
yet, neuroscientists do not know exactly how learning is actu-
ally related to brain growth over lifetime. More research is
needed in this area. However, the fact that it is even a possibil-
ity makes a life or death decision by a teenager that much more
dangerous. Factor into this the trauma of a serious illness or ac-
cident and/or pain, and an inappropriate emotional response
would be difficult to avoid. If the decision is based on emotion
instead of good judgment, its validity would most certainly be
questionable.
THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE
Juveniles who wish to be adjudged as mature minors even-
tually find themselves in the repository of the judicial system.
Are judges really qualified to make a possibly fatal decision for
a minor they don't know, based on subjective data gathered by
other professionals? Do judges even want to be in this position?
Although judges make numerous decisions that affect the lives
of people, adjudging a minor to be a "mature minor" and al-
lowing him to make a decision when that minor rejects life-
sustaining treatment, is the only decision they make that may
result in the death of that minor. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Professor
of Law and Director of the Juvenile Justice Clinic at George-
town University Law School, has written:
"' See id. at 22.
140 See Sowell et al., supra note 116, at 860.
141 See McCrone, supra note 138, at 27; see also Spear, supra note 122, at
114.
142See McCrone, supra note 138, at 27.
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When making decisions concerning a child, judges con-
sider prior events and legal principles in order to make
predictions about a child's future .... The legal principles
judges use to decide cases about children are often
vague .... [R]esearch concerning child development sug-
gests that concepts like "knowing, intelligent, and vol-
untary"-while somewhat immutable when applied to
the adult reasoning process-is fluid prior to adult-
hood.1 43
It would, therefore, be difficult for judges to apply these
concepts in a uniform manner to cases involving the mature mi-
nor doctrine because the stage of development of the child can-
not be fully known by the judge. 144 Strong opinions and prefer-
ences of the adolescent, in addition to societal effects on this
age group, greatly influence the adolescent's decisions. When
they voice a preference, they may think they know what they
want, but it is difficult to evaluate the rationale for the decision
made at that time. They express strong opinions and prefer-
ences, but at times do not really know what they want. 145 In
custody cases, a juvenile may choose one parent over the other
due to material benefits received from the chosen parent; they
may choose emancipation to escape from what they perceive as
a too controlling environment; they may choose to reject painful
medical treatment because they believe life would be easier
without it. Adolescents tend to think in terms of immediacy, not
the future. Judges are forced to evaluate valid scientific infor-
mation presented to them about child development, and then
render what they believe to be an ethical decision that will gov-
ern the life and/or death of the child. In the instance of allowing
a minor to reject life-sustaining treatment, judges are in effect,
giving a death sentence. If they allow the minor to refuse the
treatment in the face of parental opposition, the minor will most
assuredly die. It is the only judicial circumstance whereby the
judge issues what can amount to a death sentence for an indi-
vidual that does not constitute punishment for a previously
143 Mlyniec, supra note 90, at 1873-74.
144 See id. at 1874 (stating that the impact of scientific and societal changes on
childhood and adolescence make it difficult for judges to make clear decisions in
cases involving minors).
145 See id. (providing examples).
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committed action. Is it fair to ask the judge to allow the minor
to make this decision to end his life?
The necessity of deciding that a minor is mature places a
judge in a most precarious position. Because his decision may
result in the death of a child, he is understandably reluctant to
permit a minor to reject life-sustaining medical treatment,
whether the child's decision is a valid "adult" decision or not.
Court hearings can result from circumstances that arise when
there is a conflict between the parental decision to administer
treatment and the minor's rejection of that treatment. It does not
seem reasonable that a judge, although impartial and objective,
should make a decision to reject a minor's medical treatment.
He does not know the child or the child's behavior and envi-
ronment intimately enough, even with the assistance of existing
but inconsistent expert testimony. He is in fact a stranger to the
immediate situation in most instances and, if the case is one of
first impression, has little or no case history to evaluate. The
responsibility to make the decision should ultimately fall to the
parents, but only after consultation with the appropriate health
care professionals and possibly ethics committees.
THE NON-LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
The medical community has addressed this issue more than
a few times. Both the American Academy of Pediatrics 46 and
the Midwest Bioethics Center of Kansas City, Missouri 47 have
supported to some degree the right of mature minors, who are
deemed to be competent, to consent or reject medical treatment
to sustain life.
The American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on
Bioethics (AAP) has published position statements recognizing
the ability of children with capacity to make medical treatment
decisions in life-sustaining situations, and have included guide-
lines for physicians. 148 Although the AAP's guidelines state that
146 See Committee on Bioethics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Guidelines
on Forgoing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 93 PEDIATRICS 532 (1994) (setting
guidelines for withholding or terminating life-sustaining treatment for minors).
147 See Joan-Margaret Kun, Comment, Rejecting the Adage "Children Should
Be Seen and Not Heard"-The Mature Minor Doctrine, 16 PACE L. REv. 423, 442-44
(1996) (discussing guidelines set by the Midwest Bioethics Center, see Midwest
Bioethics Center Task Force on Health Care Rights for Minors, Health Care Treat-
ment Decision-Making Guidelines for Minors, BIoETHIcs F., Winter 1995).
148 See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 146, at 533-36.
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minors possessing decision-making capacity should be informed
and permitted to make health care decisions, the AAP does not
explain how these guidelines are to be implemented. They de-
fine decision-making capacity as: "(1) the ability to understand
and communicate information relevant to a decision; (2) the
ability to reason and deliberate concerning the decision; and (3)
the ability to apply a set of values to a decision that may involve
conflicting elements." 149 There is no discussion as to how these
determinations are to be made, who will make the determina-
tion, or who will finally decide that the minor's capacity is suf-
ficiently adequate to reject the treatment.
The Midwest Bioethics Center based its model on the as-
sumptions that age does not necessarily determine decision-
making capacity, children are not the property of parents, mi-
nors have an independent moral status and legal standing, and
mature minors should be governed by a presumption of capac-
ity. 150 It suggested that children should be involved in the deci-
sions regarding their health care and that a minor patient should
be included in the informed consent process. 151 When a dis-
agreement between parent and child develops, the center sug-
gested that talking to a different health care provider or con-
sulting with a hospital's ethics committee might assist in re-
solving the dispute. 152
Parents of children who do not exhibit decision-making ca-
pacity generally make health care decisions concerning treat-
ment of their children. Although the Bioethics Committee of the
American Academy of Pediatrics recognized this in its policy
statement released in 1994, it stated that weight should be given
to a child's preference when life-sustaining treatment was at
issue. It noted three separate elements that should be consid-
ered when determining capacity: (1) the ability to understand
and communicate information relevant to a decision; (2) the
ability to reason and deliberate concerning a decision; and (3)
the ability to apply a set of values to a decision that involves a
conflict. Furthermore, a presumption in favor of treatment
should be made when a medical professional believes that the
family's wishes conflict with the interests of the child. 153
149 Id. at 532.
150 See Kun, supra note 147, at 442.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 442-43.
153 See Committee on Bioethics, supra note 146, at 533.
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A task force composed of 25 health professionals, attor-
neys, and representatives of academia and religions was estab-
lished in New York in 1985 by then Governor Cuomo to ad-
dress the issue of deciding for others in a medical treatment
situation.1 54 Although the task force suggested that minors par-
ticipate in life-sustaining treatment decisions, it refused to ex-
tend the same presumption of capacity afforded to adults in
making the decision independently, noting the difficulty that
some adolescents have in assessing the future consequences of
an action.1 55 The Task Force refused to recommend that the age
of majority be lowered in New York for making the decision to
reject life-sustaining treatment. However, it did recommend that
the minor be accorded a non-exclusive role in the decision
making process. 156 It further stated that the attending physician
could determine the minor's capacity by assessing his maturity,
conceptual ability and his life experience at making decisions.
Regardless of the final determination, it recommended that the
minor never have an exclusive role in making the decision. 157
CONCLUSION
It appears that every discussion and evaluation made of the
mature minor doctrine ultimately returns to "square one"-as-
sessing the capacity and/or competence of the minor. Is the mi-
nor competent to make a decision? Does the minor have the ca-
pacity to make the decision? How should capacity and compe-
tence be evaluated? The difficulty seems to be the manner by
which the minor's competence or capacity is assessed. New
theories addressing the minor's psychological development are
constantly being advanced and research materials in this area
are abundant.
The recent discovery of an adolescent phase of brain
growth and development in the areas of the brain that are con-
cerned with social judgment and self-control further contribute
to the argument that adolescents are unable to make valid, ra-
tional decisions, especially during times of stress. Possible drug
use can also affect judgments and decisions made during this
15 See NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LFE AND THE LAW, WHEN OTHERS
MUST CHOOSE: DECIDING FOR PATIENTS WITHOUT CAPACITY 130-31 (1992).
155 See id., see also Kun, supra note 147, at 451-55 (discussing decision and
rationale implemented by the Task Force).
156 See NEw YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 154.
157 See id.
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time. It would be impossible to assess, save a medical diagnos-
tic procedure such as an MRI, at what stage of brain growth an
adolescent is at the time a life-sustaining treatment decision
must be made. Furthermore, it remains to be determined spe-
cifically what the connection is between this growth and the
cognitive development of the individual.
Adolescence is a period of not only rapid physical growth
but a period of emotional and psychological development that
advances at different rates for different individuals. Many ado-
lescents are notoriously rebellious and recalcitrant, attempting
to find their own "niche" in the world of adulthood. How can
the adolescent's capacity really effectively be evaluated? By
rejecting the life-sustaining treatment, is he or she attempting to
make a statement simply to authenticate his or her own inde-
pendence or does the adolescent truly feel that the risk of death
is superior to the possibility of living?
Although it is recognized that there is no guarantee that the
controlling adult will make the correct decision in the minor's
life or death situation, it is more likely than not that this would
be the case. It would seem unwise to permit a minor, whether
"mature" or not, to make a decision that could ultimately result
in his death. There is no "cut and dried" and absolutely fool
proof method for making the evaluation of maturity. It is a sub-
jective and arbitrary process depending to a great degree on the
perceptions of the evaluator. The current bright-line demarca-
tion of childhood and adulthood, the age of eighteen, may pre-
vent at the very least a judgmental error on the part of the
evaluator. By eighteen years of age, most individuals have at-
tained a significant degree of maturity by virtue of the fact that,
if nothing else, they have lived long enough. It would seem that
even one error in evaluation of a minor as a mature minor, re-
sulting in his death by the rejection of treatment, would be one
too many.
Those states that have adopted some form of the mature
minor doctrine would be well served to disavow the same in
future decided cases involving a minor's rejection of life-
sustaining medical treatment for the following reasons:
(1) The psychological evaluation methods used to assess
the minor are inconsistent and depend somewhat on the
expertise of the professional chosen;
(2) The state applications of the mature minor doctrine are
necessarily inconsistent as a result of (1);
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(3) The guidelines used to apply the doctrine are vague;
(4) The recent discovery of an adolescent phase of brain
growth may affect the judgment and decision-making
process used by teenagers;
(5) Judges are not equipped to make decisions in such
cases; and
(6) The bright line demarcation of legal age not only has
the advantage of being a more objective standard, but is
also recognized as the universal legal criteria set for in-
dividuals to speak and act responsibly for themselves.

